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Abstract
Online social networks offer convenient ways to seamlessly
reach out to large audiences. In particular, Facebook pages are
increasingly used by businesses, brands, and organizations to
connect with multitudes of users worldwide. As the number of
likes of a page has become a de-facto measure of its popularity
and profitability, an underground market of services artificially
inflating page likes, aka like farms, has emerged alongside
Facebook’s official targeted advertising platform. Nonethe-
less, besides a few media reports, there is little work that
systematically analyzes Facebook pages’ promotion methods.
Aiming to fill this gap, we present a honeypot-based compar-
ative measurement study of page likes garnered via Facebook
advertising and from popular like farms. First, we analyze
likes based on demographic, temporal, and social characteris-
tics, and find that some farms seem to be operated by bots and
do not really try to hide the nature of their operations, while
others follow a stealthier approach, mimicking regular users’
behavior. Next, we look at fraud detection algorithms cur-
rently deployed by Facebook and show that they do not work
well to detect stealthy farms which spread likes over longer
timespans and like popular pages to mimic regular users.
To overcome their limitations, we investigate the feasibil-
ity of timeline-based detection of like farm accounts, focus-
ing on characterizing content generated by Facebook accounts
on their timelines as an indicator of genuine versus fake so-
cial activity. We analyze a wide range of features extracted
from timeline posts, which we group into two main categories:
lexical and non-lexical. We find that like farm accounts tend
to re-share content more often, use fewer words and poorer
vocabulary, and more often generate duplicate comments and
likes compared to normal users. Using relevant lexical and
non-lexical features, we build a classifier to detect like farms
accounts that achieves a precision higher than 99% and a 93%
recall.
∗A preliminary version of this paper, titled “Paying for Likes? Understanding
Facebook Like Fraud Using Honeypots” [17], appeared in the proceedings of
the 2014 ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC). Please see Section 6
for a summary of the new results presented in this version, which is published
in ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security (TOPS).
†Authors contributed equally.
‡Work done while the author was with Data61-CSIRO.
1 Introduction
Online social networks provide organizations and public
figures with a range of tools to reach out to/broaden their au-
dience. Among these, Facebook pages make it easy to broad-
cast updates, publicize products and events, and get in touch
with customers and fans. Facebook allows page owners to pro-
mote their pages via targeted advertisement, i.e., pages can be
“suggested” to users from specific age or location groups, or
with certain interests. Page ads constitute one of the primary
sources of revenue for Facebook, as its advertising platform
overall is reportedly used by 2 million small businesses, out of
the 40 million which have active pages [41].
At the same time, as the number of likes on a Facebook
page is considered a measure of its popularity [11], an ecosys-
tem of so-called “like farms” has emerged that offers paid
services to artificially inflate the number of likes on Face-
book pages. These farms rely on fake and compromised ac-
counts as well as incentivized collusion networks where users
are paid for actions from their account [50]. Popular media
reports [12, 31, 2, 32, 36] have speculated that Facebook ad
campaigns may also garner significant amounts of fake likes,
due to farm accounts’ attempt to diversify liking activities and
avoid Facebook’s fraud detection algorithms. With the price
charged by like farms varying, for 1000 likes, from $14.99–
$70 for worldwide users to $59.95–$190 for USA users, it is
not far fetched to assume that selling likes may yield signifi-
cant profits for fraudsters. This also creates potential problems
for providers like Facebook as they lose potential ad revenues
while possibly disenfranchising page owners who receive likes
from users who do not engage with their page. However, even
though the understanding of fake likes is crucial to improve
fraud mitigation in social networks, there has been little work
to systematically analyze and compare Facebook page promo-
tion methods. With this motivation in mind, we set to shed
light on the like farming ecosystem with the aim of character-
izing features and behaviors that can be useful to effectively
detect them. In the process, we review the fraud detection
tools currently deployed by Facebook and assess their efficacy
for more sophisticated like farms.
Specifically, our paper makes three main contributions:
1. We present a first-of-its-kind honeypot-based compara-
tive measurement study of page likes garnered via Face-
book ads and like farms, and analyze likes based on de-
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mographic, temporal, and social characteristics;
2. We perform an empirical analysis of graph-based fraud
detection tools used by Facebook and highlight their
shortcomings against more sophisticated farms; and
3. We propose and evaluate timeline-based detection of like
farm accounts, focusing on characterizing content as an
indicator of genuine versus fake social activity, and build
a classifier, based on lexical and non-lexical features, that
detects like farm accounts with at least 99% precision and
93% recall.
1.1 Roadmap
Honeypot-based measurement of like farms. Aiming to
study fake likes garnered from like farms and, potentially,
from Facebook advertising, we create thirteen Facebook hon-
eypot pages with the description: “This is not a real page, so
please do not like it.” and intentionally kept them empty (i.e.,
no posts or pictures). We promote eight using four like farms
(i.e., targeting users in the USA and worldwide for each, as
farms mostly offer user targeting for only this two locations)
and five using Facebook ad campaigns (with two targeting
users in the USA and worldwide as the like farms. The other
three target one developed and two developing countries, as
Facebook reports that “false” accounts are less prevalent in de-
veloped markets and more in developing markets.1 After mon-
itoring likes garnered by the pages, and collecting information
about the likers (e.g., gender, age, location, friend list, etc.), we
perform a comparative analysis based on demographic, tempo-
ral, and social characteristics.
We identify two main modi operandi for the like farms: (1)
some seem to be operated by bots and do not really try to hide
their activities, delivering likes in bursts and forming discon-
nected social sub-graphs, while (2) others follow a stealthier
approach, mimicking regular users’ behavior, and rely on a
large and well-connected network structure to gradually de-
liver likes while keeping a small count of likes per user. The
first strategy reflects a “quick and dirty” approach where likes
from fake users are delivered rapidly, as opposed to the sec-
ond one, which exhibits a stealthier approach that leverages
the underlying social graph, where accounts (possibly oper-
ated by real users) slowly deliver likes. We also highlight a
few more interesting findings. When targeting Facebook users
worldwide, we obtain likes from only a few countries, and
that likers’ profiles seem skewed toward males. Moreover, we
find evidence that different like farms (with different pricing
schemes) garner likes from overlapping sets of users and, thus,
may be managed by the same operator.
Characterizing fake likes. We present the concept of liking
a page on Facebook as a binary action where likes received
on a page by users who have interest for the content of the
page are considered “good” and likes received in order to ma-
nipulate a page’s popularity ranking as “fake”. We have only
1https://goo.gl/OAxgTh.
considered to mark as fake, likes that are meant to manipu-
late a page’s popularity (i.e., by increasing the page’s number
of fans) as this is the main purpose like farms serve. On this
note, we start our study with the assumption that likers from
farms that like our empty honeypot pages are either fake or
compromised real users (i.e., fake likes) as shown in [50]. Al-
though, Facebook discourages page owners from buying fake
likes, warning that they “can be harmful to your page”2, they
also routinely launch clean-up campaigns to remove fake ac-
counts, including those engaged in like farms. Hence, we also
hypothesize that very few or no users from the Facebook Ad
campaigns will like our honeypot pages as the pages were
empty.
Aiming to counter like farms, researchers as well as Face-
book have recently been working on tools to detect fake likes.
One currently deployed tool is CopyCatch, which detects lock-
step page like patterns by analyzing the social graph between
users and pages, and the times at which the edges in the graph
are created [4]. Another one, SynchroTrap, relies on the fact
that malicious accounts usually perform loosely synchronized
actions in a variety of social network context, and can clus-
ter malicious accounts that act similarly at around the same
time for a sustained period of time [10]. The issue with
these methods, however, is that stealthier (and more expen-
sive) like farms can successfully circumvent them by spread-
ing likes over longer timespans and liking popular pages to
mimic normal users. We systematically evaluate the effective-
ness of these graph-based co-clustering fraud detection algo-
rithms [4, 10] in identifying like farm accounts. We show that
these tools incur high false positives rates for stealthy farms,
as their accounts mimic normal users.
Characterizing lexical and non-lexical timeline informa-
tion. Next, we investigate the use of timeline information,
including lexical and non-lexical characteristics of user posts,
to improve the detection of like farm accounts. To this end, we
crawl and analyze timelines of user accounts associated with
like farms as well as a baseline of normal user accounts. Our
analysis of timeline information highlights several differences
in both lexical and non-lexical features of baseline and like
farm users. In particular, we find that timeline posts by like
farm accounts have 43% fewer words, a more limited vocabu-
lary, and lower readability than normal users’ posts. Moreover,
like farm accounts’ posts generate significantly more com-
ments and likes, and a much larger fraction of their posts con-
sists of “shared activity” (i.e., sharing posts from other users,
news articles, videos, and external URLs).
Detection. Based on our characterization, we extract a set
of timeline-based features and use them to train three clas-
sifiers using supervised two-class support vector machines
(SVM) [33]. Our first and second classifiers use, respectively,
lexical and non-lexical features extracted from timeline posts,
while the third one uses both. We evaluate the classifiers us-
ing the ground-truth dataset of like farm accounts and show
2See https://www.facebook.com/help/241847306001585.
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that they achieve 99–100% precision and 93–97% recall in
detecting like farm accounts. Finally, we generalize our ap-
proach using other classification algorithms, namely, decision
tree [7], AdaBoost [20], kNN [1], random forest [6], and naı¨ve
Bayes [55], and empirically confirm that the SVM classifier
achieves higher accuracy across the board.
1.2 Paper organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents our honeypot-based comparative measurement of
likes garnered using farms and legitimate Facebook ad cam-
paigns. Then, Section 3 evaluates the accuracy of state-of-the-
art co-clustering techniques to detect like farm accounts in our
datasets. Next, we study timeline based features (both non-
lexical and lexical) in Section 4, and evaluate the classifiers
built using these features in Section 5. After reviewing related
work in Section 6, the paper concludes in Section 7.
2 Honeypot-based Measurement of
Facebook Like Farms
This section details our honeypot-based comparative mea-
surement study of page likes garnered via Facebook ads and
by like farms.
2.1 Datasets
In the following, we present the methodology used to de-
ploy, monitor, and promote our Facebook honeypot pages.
Honeypot Pages. In March 2014, we created 13 Facebook
pages called “Virtual Electricity” and intentionally kept them
empty (i.e., no posts or pictures). Their description included:
“This is not a real page, so please do not like it.” 5 pages
were promoted using legitimate Facebook (FB) ad campaigns
targeting users, respectively, in USA, France, India, Egypt,
and worldwide. The remaining 8 pages were promoted us-
ing 4 popular like farms: BoostLikes.com (BL), SocialFor-
mula.com (SF), AuthenticLikes.com (AL), and MammothSo-
cials.com (MS), targeting worldwide or USA users.
In Table 1, we provide details of the honeypot pages, along
with the corresponding ad campaigns. All campaigns were
launched on March 12, 2014, using a different administrator
account (owner) for each page. Each Facebook campaign was
budgeted at a maximum of $6/day to a total of $90 for 15 days.
The price for buying likes varied across like farms: Boost-
Likes charged the highest price for “100% real likes” ($70
and $190 for 1000 likes in 15 days from, respectively, world-
wide and USA). Other like farms also claimed to deliver likes
from “genuine”, “real”, and “active” profiles, but promised to
deliver them in fewer days. Overall, the price of 1000 likes
varied between $14.99–$70 for worldwide users and $59.95–
$190 for USA users.
Data Collection. We monitored the “liking” activity on the
honeypot pages by crawling them every 2 hours using Sele-
nium web driver. At the end of the campaigns, we reduced the
frequency of monitoring to once a day, and stopped monitoring
when a page did not receive a like for more than a week. We
used Facebook’s reports tool for page administrators, which
provides a variety of aggregated statistics about attributes and
profiles of page likers. Facebook also provides these statistics
for the global Facebook population. Since a majority of Face-
book users do not set the visibility of their age and location to
public [13], we used these reports to collect statistics about lik-
ers’ gender, age, country, home and current town. Later in this
section, we will use these statistics to compare distributions
of our honeypot pages’ likers to that of the overall Facebook
population. We also crawled public information from the lik-
ers’ profiles, obtaining the lists of liked pages as well as friend
lists, which are not provided in the reports. Overall, we iden-
tify more than 6.3 million total likes by users who liked our
honeypot pages and more than 1 million friendship relations.
Campaign Summary. In Table 1, we report the total number
of likes garnered by each campaign, along with the number of
days we monitored the honeypot pages. Note that the BL-ALL
and MS-ALL campaigns remained inactive, i.e., they did not
result in any likes even though we were charged in advance.
We tried to reach the like farm admins several times but re-
ceived no response. Overall, we collected a total of 6,222
likes (4,453 from like farms and 1,769 from Facebook ads).
The largest number of likes were garnered by AL-USA, the
lowest (excluding inactive campaigns) by FB-USA.
Ethics Considerations. Although we only collected openly
available data, we did collect (public) profile information from
our honeypot pages’ likers, e.g., friend lists and page likes. We
could not request consent but enforced a few mechanisms to
protect user privacy: all data were encrypted at rest and not
re-distributed, and no personal information was extracted, i.e.,
we only analyzed aggregated statistics. We are also aware that
paying farms to generate fake likes might raise ethical con-
cerns, however, this was crucial to create the honeypots and
observe the like farms’ behavior. We believe that the study
will help, in turn, to understand and counter these activities.
Also note that the amount of money each farm received was
small ($190 at most) and that this research was reviewed and
approved by Data61’s legal team. We also received ethical ap-
proval from the ethics committee of UCL where, in conjunc-
tion with Data61, data was collected and analyzed.
2.2 Location and Demographics Analysis
We now set to compare the characteristics of the likes gar-
nered by the honeypot pages promoted via legitimate Face-
book campaigns and those obtained via like farms.
Location. For each campaign, we looked at the distribution of
likers’ countries: as shown in Figure 1, for the first four Face-
book campaigns (FB-USA, FB-FRA, FB-IND, FB-EGY), we
mainly received likes from the targeted country (87–99.8%),
even though FB-USA and FB-FRA generated a number of
likes much smaller than any other campaign. When we tar-
geted Facebook users worldwide (FB-ALL), we almost exclu-
3
Campaign Provider Location Budget Duration Moni- #Likes #Termi-
ID toring nated
FB-USA Facebook.com USA $6/day 15 days 22 days 32 0
FB-FRA Facebook.com France $6/day 15 days 22 days 44 0
FB-IND Facebook.com India $6/day 15 days 22 days 518 2
FB-EGY Facebook.com Egypt $6/day 15 days 22 days 691 6
FB-ALL Facebook.com Worldwide $6/day 15 days 22 days 484 3
BL-ALL BoostLikes.com Worldwide $70.00 15 days - - -
BL-USA BoostLikes.com USA only $190.00 15 days 22 days 621 1
SF-ALL SocialFormula.com Worldwide $14.99 3 days 10 days 984 11
SF-USA SocialFormula.com USA $69.99 3 days 10 days 738 9
AL-ALL AuthenticLikes.com Worldwide $49.95 3-5 days 12 days 755 8
AL-USA AuthenticLikes.com USA $59.95 3-5 days 22 days 1038 36
MS-ALL MammothSocials.com Worldwide $20.00 - - - -
MS-USA MammothSocials.com USA only $95.00 - 12 days 317 9
Table 1: Facebook and like farm campaigns used to promote the Facebook honeypot pages. Like farms promised to deliver 1000 likes in 15
days at differing prices depending on the geographical target (i.e., USA and worldwide) whereas on Facebook, we budgeted $6 per day for the
promotion of each page for a period of 15 days.
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Figure 1: Geolocation of the likers (per campaign).
sively received likes from India (96%). Looking at the like
farms, most likers from SocialFormula were based in Turkey,
regardless of whether we requested a US-only campaign. The
other three farms delivered likes complying to our requests,
e.g., for US-only campaigns, the pages received a majority
of likes from US profiles. The location result supports Face-
book’s claim that “the percentage of accounts that are dupli-
cate or false is meaningfully lower in developed markets such
as the United States or United Kingdom and higher in devel-
oping markets such as India and Turkey.”3 It also potentially
supports the claim that like farm accounts diversify their liking
activities by liking pages promoted via Facebook ads to avoid
Facebook’s fraud detection algorithms (we further explore this
in section 2.5).
Other Demographics. In Table 2, we show the distribution
of likers’ gender and age, and also compare them to the global
Facebook network (last row). The last column reports the KL-
divergence between the age distribution of the campaign users
3https://goo.gl/OAxgTh.
Campaign Gender – Age Distribution (%) –
ID % F/M 13-17 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55+ KL
FB-USA 54/46 54.0 27.0 6.8 6.8 1.4 4.1 0.45
FB-FR 46/54 60.8 20.8 8.7 2.6 5.2 1.7 0.54
FB-IND 7/93 52.7 43.5 2.3 0.7 0.5 0.3 1.12
FB-EGY 18/82 54.6 34.4 6.4 2.9 0.8 0.8 0.64
FB-ALL 6/94 51.3 44.4 2.1 1.1 0.5 0.6 1.04
BL-USA 53/47 34.2 54.5 8.8 1.5 0.7 0.5 0.60
SF-ALL 37/63 19.8 33.3 21.0 15.2 7.2 2.8 0.04
SF-USA 37/63 22.3 34.6 22.9 11.6 5.4 2.9 0.04
AL-ALL 42/58 15.8 52.8 13.4 9.7 5.2 3.0 0.12
AL-USA 31/68 7.2 41.0 35.0 10.0 3.5 2.8 0.09
MS-USA 26/74 8.6 46.9 34.5 6.4 1.9 1.4 0.17
Facebook 46/54 14.9 32.3 26.6 13.2 7.2 5.9 –
Table 2: Gender and age statistics of likers.
and that of the entire Facebook population, highlighting large
divergence for FB-IND, FB-EGY, and FB-ALL, which are bi-
ased toward younger users. These three campaigns also ap-
pear to be skewed toward male profiles. In contrast, the demo-
graphics of likers from SocialFormula and, to a lesser extent,
AuhtenticLikes and MammothSocials, are much more similar
to those of the entire network, even though male users are still
over-represented.
2.3 Temporal Analysis
We also analyzed temporal patterns observed for each of
the campaigns. In Figure 2, we plot the cumulative number
of likes observed on each honeypot page over our observa-
tion period (15 days). We observe from Figure 2(a) that all the
like farm campaigns, except BoostLikes, exhibit a very similar
trend with a few bursts of a large number of likes. Specifically,
for the SocialFormula, AuthenticLikes, and MammothSocials
campaigns, likes were garnered within a short period of time
of two hours. With AuthenticLikes, we observed likes from
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Figure 2: Time series of cumulative number of likes for Facebook and like farms campaigns.
more than 700 profiles within the first 4 hours of the second
day of data collection. Interestingly, no more likes were ob-
served later on. On the contrary, the BoostLikes campaign
targeting US users shows a different temporal behavior: the
trend is actually comparable to that observed in the Facebook
Ads campaigns (see Figure 2(b)). The number of likes steadily
increases during the observation period and no abrupt changes
are observed.
This suggests that two different strategies may be adopted
by like farms. On the one hand, the abrupt increase in the
cumulative number of likes happening during a short period
of time might likely be due to automated scripts operating a
set of fake profiles. These profiles are instrumented to sat-
isfy the number of likes as per the customer’s request. On the
other hand, BoostLikes’s strategy, which resembles the tem-
poral evolution in Facebook campaigns, seems to rely on the
underlying social graph, possibly constituted by fake profiles
operated by humans. Results presented in the next section cor-
roborate the existence of these two strategies.
2.4 Social Graph Analysis
Next, we evaluated the social graph induced by the likers’
profiles. To this end, we associated each user with one of the
like farm services based on the page they liked. Note that a few
users liked pages in multiple campaigns, as we will discuss in
Section 2.5. A significant fraction of users actually liked pages
corresponding to both the AuthenticLikes and the Mammoth-
Socials campaigns (see Figure 5): we put these users into a
separate group, labelled as ALMS. Table 3 summarizes the
number of likers associated with each service, as well as addi-
tional details about their friendship networks. Note that the
number of likers reported for each campaign in Table 3 is
different from the number of campaign likes (Table 1), since
some users liked more than one page.
Many likers kept their friend lists private: this occurred for
almost 80% of likers in the Facebook campaigns, about 75%
in the BoostLikes campaign, and much less frequently for the
other like farm campaigns (∼40–60%). The number and per-
centage of users with public friend lists are reported in Table 3.
The fourth column reports the average number of friends (±
the standard deviation) for profiles with visible friend lists, and
the fifth column reports the median. Some friendship rela-
tions may be hidden, e.g., if a friend chose to be invisible in
friend lists, thus, these numbers only represent a lower bound.
The average number of friends of users associated with the
BoostLikes campaign (and to a smaller extent, the Authenti-
cLikes campaign) was much higher than the average number
of friends observed elsewhere.
To evaluate the social ties between likers, we looked at
friendship relations between likers (either originating from the
same campaign provider or not), ignoring friendship relations
with Facebook users who did not like any of our pages. Table 3
(sixth column) reports, for each provider, the overall number
of friendship relationships between likers that involved users
associated with the provider.
In Figure 3(a), we plot the social graph induced by such
friendship relations (likers who did not have friendship re-
lations with any other likers were excluded from the graph).
Based on the resulting social structure, we suggest that:
1. Dense relations between likers from BoostLikes point to
an interconnected network of real users, or fake users
who mimic complex ties to pose as real users;
2. The pairs (and occasionally triplets) that characterize So-
cialFormula likers might indicate a different strategy of
constructing fake networks, mitigating the risk that iden-
tification of a user as fake would consequently bring
down the whole connected network of fake users; and
3. The friendship relations between AuthenticLikes and
MammothSocials likers might indicate that the same op-
erator manages both services.
We also considered indirect links between likers, through
mutual friends. Table 3 reports the overall number of 2-hop
relationships between likers from the associated provider. Fig-
ure 3(b) plots the relations between likers who either have a
5
Provider #Likers #Likers with Avg (± Std) Median #Friendships #2-Hop Friend-
Public Friend #Friends #Friends Between ship Relations
Lists Likers Between Likers
FB 1448 261 (18.0%) 315 ± 454 198 6 169
BL 621 161 (25.9%) 1171 ± 1096 850 540 2987
SF 1644 954 (58.0%) 246 ± 330 155 50 1132
AL 1597 680 (42.6%) 719 ± 973 343 64 1174
MS 121 62 (51.2%) 250 ± 585 68 4 129
ALMS 213 101 (47.4%) 426 ± 961 46 27 229
Table 3: Likers and friendships between likers.
(a) Direct friendship relations (b) 2-hop friendship relations
Figure 3: Friendship relations between likers of different campaigns.
direct relation or a mutual friend, clearly pointing to the pres-
ence of relations between likers from the same provider. These
tight connections, along with the number of their friends, sug-
gest that we only see a small part of these networks. For So-
cialFormula, AuthenticLikes, and MammothSocials, we also
observe many isolated pairs and triplets of likers who are not
connected. One possible explanation is that farm users cre-
ate fake Facebook accounts and keep them separate from their
personal accounts and friends. In contrast, the BoostLikes net-
work is well-connected.
To further compare connectivity of BoostLikes versus So-
cialFormula, AuthenticLikes, and MammothSocials, we ana-
lyze the structural properties of the social graph visualized in
Figure 3(b). Figure 4 plots distributions of degree, number
of triangles, clustering coefficient, and cliques for these like
farms. The distributions demonstrate that BoostLikes accounts
have dense connectivity as compared to accounts belonging to
SocialFormula, AuthenticLikes, and MammothSocials. More
specifically, BoostLikes accounts have higher degree, are part
of more triangles, have higher clustering coefficient, and have
larger maximal cliques than other like farms. For example, the
average degree of BoostLikes accounts is 18 while other like
farms have average degrees of less than 5. Moreover, more
than 25% of BoostLikes accounts make maximal cliques of
size greater than 10 while less than 1% accounts of the other
like farms make maximal cliques of size greater than 10.
2.5 Page Like Analysis
We then looked at the other pages liked by profiles attracted
to our honeypot pages. In Figure 5(a) and 5(b), respectively,
we plot the distribution of the number of page likes for Face-
book ads’ and like farm campaigns’ users. To draw a base-
line comparison, we also collected page like counts from a
random set of 2,000 Facebook users, extracted from an unbi-
ased sample of Facebook user population. The original sample
was crawled for another project [14], obtained by randomly
sampling Facebook public directory which lists all the IDs of
searchable profiles.
We observed a large variance in the number of pages liked,
ranging from 1 to 10,000. The median page like count ranged
between 600 and 1000 for users from the Facebook campaigns
and between 1200 and 1800 for those from like farm cam-
paigns, with the exception of the BL-USA campaign (median
was 63). In contrast, the median page like count for our base-
line Facebook user sample was 34. The page like counts of
our baseline sample mirrored numbers reported in prior work,
e.g., according to [28], the average number of pages liked by
Facebook users amounts to roughly 40. In other words, our
honeypot pages attracted users that tend to like significantly
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Figure 4: Structural properties of the graph of 2-hop relationships among likers of like farm campaigns.
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Figure 5: Distribution of the number of likes by users in Facebook and like farm campaigns.
more pages than regular Facebook users. Since our honeypot
pages both for Facebook and like farm campaigns explicitly
indicated they were not “real”, we argue that a vast majority
of the garnered likes are fake. We argue that these users like
a large number of pages because they are probably reused for
multiple “jobs” and also like “normal” pages to mimic real
users.4
To confirm our hypothesis, for each pair of campaigns, we
4Facebook does not impose any limit on the maximum number of page likes
per user.
plot their Jaccard similarity. Specifically, let Sk denote the set
of pages liked by a user k: the Jaccard similarity between the
set of likes by likers of two campaigns A and B, which we
plot in Figure 6(a), is defined as |A∩B|/|A∪B|, where A =⋃
∀i∈A Si and B =
⋃
∀j∈B Sj . We also plot, in Figure 6(b),
the similarity between A′ =
⋃
∀i∈A i and B
′ =
⋃
∀j∈B j,
i.e., the similarity between the set of likers of the different
campaigns.
Note from Figure 6 that FB-IND, FB-EGY, and FB-ALL
have relatively large (Jaccard) similarity with each other. In
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addition, the SF-USA and SF-ALL pair and the AL-USA and
MS-USA pair also have relatively large Jaccard similarity.
These findings suggest that the same fake profiles are used
in multiple campaigns by a like farm (e.g., SF-ALL and SF-
USA). Moreover, some fake profiles seem to be shared by
different like farms (e.g., AL-USA and MS-USA), suggesting
that they are run by the same operator.
2.6 Discussion
Overall, we identified two main modi operandi: (1) some
farms, like SocialFormula and AuthenticLikes, seem to be
operated by bots and do not really try to hide the nature of
their operations, as demonstrated by large bursts of likes and
the limited number of friends per profile; (2) other farms,
like BoostLikes, follow a much stealthier approach, aiming to
mimic regular users’ behavior, and rely on their large and well-
connected network structure to disseminate the target likes
while keeping a small count of likes per user. For the latter,
we also observed a high number of friends per profile and a
“reasonable” number of likes.
A month after the campaigns, we checked whether or not
likers’ accounts were still active: as shown in Table 1, only
one account associated with BoostLikes was terminated, as
opposed to 9, 20, and 44 for the other like farms. 11 accounts
from the regular Facebook campaigns were also terminated.
Although occurring not so frequently, the accounts’ termina-
tion might be indicative of the disposable nature of fake ac-
counts on most like farms, where “bot-like” patterns are actu-
ally easy to detect. It also mirrors the challenge Facebook is
confronted by, with like farms such as BoostLikes that exhibit
patterns closely resembling real users’ behavior, thus making
fake like detection quite difficult.
We stress that our findings do not necessarily imply that
advertising on Facebook is ineffective, since our campaigns
were specifically designed to avert real users. However, we
do provide strong evidence that likers attracted on our honey-
pot pages, even when using legitimate Facebook campaigns,
are significantly different from typical Facebook users, which
confirms the concerns about the genuineness of these likes.
We also show that most fake likes exhibit some peculiar char-
acteristics – including demographics, likes, temporal and so-
cial graph patterns – that can and should be exploited by like
fraud detection algorithms.
3 Limitations of Graph Co-Clustering
Techniques
Aiming to counter fraudulent activities, including like
farms, Facebook has recently deployed detection tools such as
CopyCatch [4] and SynchroTrap [10]. These tools use graph
co-clustering algorithms to detect large groups of malicious
accounts that like similar pages around the same time frame.
However, as shown in Section 2, some stealthy like farms seem
to deliberately modify their behavior in order to avoid syn-
chronized patterns, which might reduce the effectiveness of
these detection tools. Specifically, while several farms use a
large number of accounts (possibly fake or compromised) lik-
ing target pages within a short timespan, some spread likes
over longer timespans and onto popular pages aiming to cir-
cumvent fraud detection algorithms. In this section, we ana-
lyze the efficacy of state-of-the-art co-clustering algorithms on
our dataset of like farm users.
3.1 Re-Crawling
Our experiments use, as ground truth, the Facebook ac-
counts gathered as part of the honeypot-based measurement
of like farms. Recall (from Section 2) that we garnered 5,918
likes from 5,616 unique users, specifically, 1,437 unique ac-
counts from Facebook ad campaigns and 4,179 unique ac-
counts from the like farm campaigns (note that some users
liked more than one honeypot pages). In Summer 2015, we
checked how many accounts had been closed or terminated
and found that 624 out of 5,616 accounts (11%) were no longer
active. We then began to crawl the pages liked by each of the
4,179 like farm users (again, using Selenium web driver). We
collected basic information associated with each page, such
as the total number of likes, category, and location, using the
page identifier. Unlike our previous crawl, we now also col-
lected the timelines of the like farm accounts, specifically,
timeline posts (up to a maximum of 500 recent posts), the
comments on each post, as well as the associated number of
likes and comments on each post.
Besides some accounts having become inactive (376), we
also could not crawl the timeline of 24 users who had re-
stricted the visibility of their timeline. Moreover, in Fall 2015,
Facebook blocked all the accounts we were using for crawl-
ing, and so we stopped our data collection before we could
completely finish our data collection, hence, we missed fur-
ther 109 users. In summary, our new dataset consists of 3,670
users (out of the initial 4,179), with more than 234K posts
(messages, shared content, check-ins, etc) for these accounts.
In our experiments, we will also rely on a baseline of 1,408
random accounts from Chen et al. [14] which we use to form
a baseline of “normal” accounts. For each of these accounts,
we again collected posts from their timeline, their page likes,
and information from these pages. 53% of the accounts had at
least 10 visible posts on the timeline, and in total we collected
about 35K posts.
Table 4 summarizes the data used in the experiments pre-
sented in the rest of the paper. Note that users who like more
than one honeypot pages are included in all rows, hence the
disparity between the number of unique users (3,670) and the
total reported in the table (3,899). Overall, we gathered in-
formation from 600K unique pages, liked by 3,670 like farm
accounts and 1,408 baseline accounts, and around 270K posts.
Again, note that we collected openly available data such
as (public) profile and timeline information, as well as page
likes. Also, all data was encrypted at rest and has not been re-
distributed. No personal information was extracted as we only
analyzed aggregated statistics. We also consulted Data61’s le-
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Figure 6: Jaccard index similarity (×100) matrices of page likes and likers across different campaigns.
Campaign #Users #Pages #Pages Liked #Posts
Liked (Unique)
BL-USA 583 79,025 37,283 44,566
SF-ALL 870 879,369 108,020 46,394
SF-USA 653 340,964 75,404 38,999
AL-ALL 707 162,686 46,230 61,575
AL-USA 827 441,187 141,214 30,715
MS-USA 259 412,258 141,262 12,280
Tot. Farms 3,899 2,315,489 549,413 234,529
Baseline 1,408 79,247 57,384 34,903
Table 4: Overview of the datasets used in our study.
gal team, which classified our research as exempt and likewise,
received approval from the ethics committee of UCL.
3.2 Experimental Evaluation of Co-Clustering
We use the labeled dataset of 3,670 users from six different
like farms and the 1,408 baseline users, and employ a graph
co-clustering algorithm to divide the user-page bipartite graph
into distinct clusters [25]. Similar to CopyCatch [4] and Syn-
chroTrap [10], the clusters identified in the user-page bipar-
tite graph represent near-bipartite cores, and the set of users
in a near-bipartite core like the same set of pages. Since we
are interested in distinguishing between two classes of users
(like farm users and normal users), we set the target number
of clusters at 2. Given that our crawlers were restricted to
crawl the behavior of all like farms and baseline users on daily
basis, we do not have fine-grained features to further analyze
CopyCatch and SynchroTrap. Aiming to reveal the liking be-
havior of like farms users, we evaluate the employed graph
co-clustering schemes of CopyCatch and SynchroTrap on our
collected datasets.
Results. In Table 5, we report the receiver operating charac-
teristic (ROC) statistics of the graph co-clustering algorithm
– specifically, true positives (TP), false positives (FP), true
Campaign TP FP TN FN Precision Recall F1-Score
AL-USA 681 9 569 4 98% 99% 99%
AL-ALL 448 53 527 1 89% 99% 94%
BL-USA 523 588 18 0 47% 100% 64%
SF-USA 428 67 512 1 86% 100% 94%
SF-ALL 431 48 530 2 90% 99% 95%
MS-USA 201 22 549 2 90% 99% 93%
Table 5: Effectiveness of the graph co-clustering algorithm.
negatives (TN), false negatives (FN), Precision: (TP )/(TP +
FP ), Recall: (TP )/(TP + FN), and F1-Score, i.e., the har-
monic average of precision and recall. Figure 7 visualizes the
clustering results as user-page scatter plots. The x-axis rep-
resents the user index and the y-axis the page index.5 The
vertical black line marks the separation between two clusters.
The points in the scatter plot are colored to indicate true pos-
itives (green), true negatives (blue), false positives (red), and
false negatives (black).
Analysis. We observe two distinct behaviors in the scatter
plots: (1) “liking everything” (vertical streaks), and (2) “ev-
eryone liking a particular page” (horizontal streaks). Both
like farm and normal users exhibit vertical and horizontal
streaks in the scatter plots.
While the graph co-clustering algorithm neatly separates
users for AL-USA, it incurs false positives for other like farms.
In particular, the co-clustering algorithm fails to achieve a
good separation for BL-USA, where it incurs a large number
of false positives, resulting in 47% precision. Further analy-
sis reveals that the horizontal false positive streaks in BL-USA
include popular pages, such as “Fast & Furious” and “Sponge-
Bob SquarePants,” each with millions of likes. We deduce that
stealthy like farms, such as BL-USA, use the tactic of liking
popular pages aiming to mimic normal users, which reduces
the accuracy of the graph co-clustering algorithm.
5To ease presentation, we exclude users and pages with less than 10 likes.
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Our results highlight the limitations of prior graph co-
clustering algorithms in detecting fake likes by like farm ac-
counts. We argue that fake liking activity is challenging to
detect when only relying on monitoring the liking activity due
to the increased sophistication of stealthier like farms. There-
fore, as we discuss next, we plan to leverage the characteristics
of timeline features to improve accuracy.
4 Characterizing Timeline Features
Motivated by the poor accuracy of graph co-clustering
based detection tools on stealthy farms, we set to evaluate the
feasibility of timeline-based detection of like farm accounts.
To this end, we characterize timeline activities for users in our
datasets (cf. Section 3.1) with respect to two categories of fea-
tures, non-lexical and lexical, aiming to identify the most dis-
tinguishing features to be used by machine learning algorithms
(in Section 5) for accurately classifying like farms vs regular
accounts.
4.1 Analysis of Non-Lexical Features
Comments and Likes. In Figure 8(a), we plot the distribu-
tions of the number of comments a post attracts, revealing that
users of AL-ALL like farm generate many more comments
than the baseline users. We note that BL-USA is almost iden-
tical to the baseline users. Next, Figure 8(b) shows the number
of likes associated with users’ posts, highlighting that posts of
like farm users attract much more likes than those of baseline
users. Therefore, posts produced by the former gather more
likes (and also have lower lexical richness as shown later on in
Table 6), which might actually indicate their attempt to mask
suspicious activities.
Shared Content. We next study the distributions of posts that
are classified as “shared activity,” i.e., originally made by an-
other user, or articles, images, or videos linked from an ex-
ternal URL (e.g., a blog or YouTube). Figure 8(c) shows that
baseline users generate more original posts, and share fewer
posts or links, compared to farm users.
Words per Post. Figure 8(d) plots the distributions of number
of words that make up a text-based post, highlighting that posts
of like farm users tend to have fewer words. Roughly half of
the users in four of the like farms (AL-ALL, BL-USA, SF-
ALL, and SF-USA) use 10 or less words in their posts, versus
17 words by baseline users.
4.2 Analysis of Lexical Features
We now look at features that relate to the content of time-
line posts, similar lexical features could be extracted for other
non-English languages. We acknowledge that the extraction
of lexical features of a non-English language is a challeng-
ing task and the extraction models might be prone to errors.
We constrain our analysis to only English language and argue
that lexical features extractions and analysis could be extended
for other non-English Language such as Chinese [56, 57],
French [39], and Arabic [18], and Hindi/Urdu [49]. We re-
fer the reader to [40] for more details about lexical features
used in this paper.
We have also considered user timelines as the collection of
posts and the corresponding comments on each post (i.e., all
textual content) and build a corpus of words extracted from the
timelines by applying the term frequency-inverse document
frequency (TF-IDF) statistical tool [35]. However, the overall
performance of this “bag-of-words” approach was poor, which
can be explained with the short nature of the posts. Indeed,
[22] has shown that the word frequency approach to analyze
short text on social media and blogs does not perform well.
Thus, in our work, we disregard simple TF-IDF based analy-
sis of user timelines and identify other lexical features.
Language. Next, we analyze the ratio of posts in English,
i.e., for every post we filter out all non-English ones using a
standard language detection library.6 For each user, we count
the number of English-language posts and calculate its ratio
with respect to the total number of posts. Figure 9 shows that
the baseline users and like farm users in USA (i.e., MS-USA,
BL-USA, and AL-USA) mostly post in English, while users
of worldwide campaigns (MS-ALL, BL-ALL, AL-ALL) have
significantly fewer posts in English. For example, the median
ratio of English posts for AL-ALL campaign is around 10%
and that for SF-ALL around 15%. We acknowledge that our
analysis is limited to English-only content and may be sta-
tistically biased toward non-native English speakers i.e., non-
USA campaign users. While our analysis could be extended
to other languages, we argue that English-based lexical anal-
ysis provides sufficient differences across different categories
of users. Thus, developing algorithms for language detection
and processing on non-English posts is out of the scope of this
paper.
Readability. We further analyze posts for grammatical and
semantic correctness. We parse each post to extract the num-
ber of words, sentences, punctuation, non-letters (e.g., emoti-
cons), and measure the lexical richness, as well as the Au-
tomated Readability Index (ARI) [38] and Flesch score [19].
Lexical richness, defined as the ratio of number of unique
words to total number of words, reveals noticeable repetitions
of distinct words, while the ARI, computed as 4.71 × average
word length) + (0.5 × average sentence length) - 21.43, esti-
mates the comprehensibility of a text corpus. Table 6 shows
a summary of the results. In comparison to like farm users,
baseline users post text with higher lexical richness (70% vs.
55%), ARI (20 vs. 15), and Flesch score (55 vs. 48), thus
suggesting that normal users use a richer vocabulary and that
their posts have higher readability.
4.3 Remarks
Our analysis of user timelines highlights several differences
in both lexical and non-lexical features of normal and like farm
users. In particular, we find that posts made by like farm
6https://python.org/pypi/langdetect [Accessed on July 18th, 2016].
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(a) AL-USA (b) AL-ALL
(c) BL-USA (d) SF-USA
(e) SF-ALL (f) MS-USA
Figure 7: Visualization of graph co-clustering results. The vertical black line indicates the separation between two clusters. We note that the
clustering algorithm fails to achieve good separation leading to a large number of false positives (red dots).
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Figure 8: Distribution of non-lexical features for like farm and baseline accounts.
Campaign Avg Avg Avg Avg Sent Avg Word Richness ARI Flesch
Chars Words Sents Length Length Score
Baseline 4,477 780 67 6.9 17.6 0.70 20.2 55.1
BL-USA 7,356 1,330 63 5.7 22.8 0.58 16.9 51.5
AL-ALL 2,835 464 32 6.2 13.9 0.59 14.8 43.6
AL-USA 2,475 394 33 6.2 12.7 0.49 14.1 54.0
SF-ALL 1,438 227 19 6.3 11.7 0.58 14.1 45.2
SF-USA 1,637 259 22 6.3 12.0 0.55 14.4 45.6
MS-USA 6,227 1,047 66 6.1 17.8 0.53 16.2 50.1
Table 6: Lexical analysis of timeline posts.
accounts have 43% fewer words, a more limited vocabulary,
and lower readability than normal users’ posts. Moreover, like
farm users generate significantly more comments and likes and
a large fraction of their posts consists of non-original and often
redundant “shared activity”.
In the next section, we will use these timelines features to
automatically detect like farm users using a machine learning
classifier.
5 Timeline-based Detection of Like
Farms
Aiming to automatically distinguish like farm users from
normal (baseline) users, we use a supervised two-class SVM
classifier [33], implemented using scikit-learn [8] (an open
source machine learning library for Python). We later com-
pare this classifier with other well-known supervised classi-
fiers such as Decision Tree [7], AdaBoost [20], kNN [1], Ran-
dom Forest [6], and Naı¨ve Bayes [55] and confirm that the
two-class SVM is the most effective in detecting like farms
users.
We extract four non-lexical features and twelve distinct lex-
ical features from the timelines of baseline and like farm users,
as explained in Section 4, using the datasets presented in Sec-
tion 3.1. The non-lexical features are the average number of
words, comments, likes per post, and re-shares. The lexical
features include: the number of characters, words, and sen-
tences; the average word length, sentence length, and number
of upper case letters; the average percentage of punctuation,
numbers, and non-letter characters; richness, ARI, and Flesch
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Figure 9: Distributions of the ratio of English posts to non-English posts.
Score.
We form two classes by labeling like farm and baseline
users’ lexical and non-lexical features as positives and nega-
tives, respectively. We use 80% and 20% of the features to
build the training and testing sets, respectively. Appropriate
values for parameters γ (radial basis function kernel param-
eter [37]) and υ (SVM parameter) are set empirically by per-
forming a greedy grid search on ranges 2−10 ≤ γ ≤ 20 and
2−10 ≤ υ ≤ 20, respectively, on each training group.
Non-Lexical Features. Table 7 reports on the accuracy of
our classifier with non-lexical features, i.e., users interactions
with posts as described in Section 4.1. Note that for each cam-
paign, we train the classifier with 80% of the non-lexical fea-
tures from baseline and campaign training sets derived from
the campaign users timelines. The poor classification perfor-
mance for the stealthiest like farm (BL-USA) suggests that
non-lexical features alone are not sufficient to accurately de-
tect like farm users.
Lexical Features. Next, we evaluate the accuracy of our clas-
sifier with lexical features, reported in Table 8. We filter out
all users with no English-language posts (i.e., with the ratio of
English posts to non-English posts, R=0, see Figure 9). Again,
we train the classifier with 80% lexical features from base-
line and like farm training sets. We observe that our clas-
sifier achieves very high precision and recall for MS-USA,
BL-USA, and AL-USA. Although the accuracy decreases by
approximately 8% for SF-USA, the overall performance sug-
gests that lexical features are useful in automatically detecting
like farm users.
Combining Lexical and Non-Lexical Features. While build-
ing a classifier based on lexical features performs very well in
detecting fake accounts, we acknowledge that lexical features
may be affected by geographical location especially if one set
of users who write in English are native speakers while the
other set is not. Therefore, we further combine both lexical
and non-lexical features to build a more robust classifier. We
also note that approximately 3% to 22% of like farm users and
14% of baseline users do not have English language posts and
are not considered in the lexical features based classification.
To include these users in our classification, for each like farm
and baseline, we set their lexical features to zeros and aggre-
gate the lexical features with non-lexical features and evaluate
our classifier with the same classification methodology as de-
tailed above. Results are summarized in Table 9, which shows
high accuracy for all like farms (F1-Score ≥ 96%), thus con-
firming the effectiveness of our timeline-based features in de-
tecting like farm users.
Comparison With Other Machine Learning Classifiers. In
order to generalize our approach, we have also used other ma-
chine learning classification algorithms, i.e., Decision Tree,
AdaBoost, kNN, Random Forest, and Naı¨ve Bayes. The train-
ing and testing of all these classifiers follow the same set-up
as the SVM approach. We again use 80% and 20% of the
combined lexical and non-lexical features to build the train-
ing and testing sets, respectively. We summarize the perfor-
mance of the classifiers in Table 10. Our results show that
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Campaign Total Training Testing TP FP TN FN Precision Recall Accuracy F1-
Users Set Set Score
BL-USA 583 466 117 37 80 270 12 76% 32% 77% 45%
AL-ALL 707 566 141 132 9 278 4 96% 94% 97% 95%
AL-USA 827 662 164 113 51 278 4 97% 69% 88% 81%
SF-ALL 870 696 174 139 35 273 9 94% 80% 90% 86%
SF-USA 653 522 131 110 21 277 5 96% 84% 94% 90%
MS-USA 259 207 52 39 13 280 2 95% 75% 96% 84%
Table 7: Effectiveness of non-lexical features (+SVM) in detecting like farm users.
Campaign Total Training Testing TP FP TN FN Precision Recall Accuracy F1-
Users Set Set Score
BL-USA 564 451 113 113 0 240 0 100% 100% 100% 100%
AL-ALL 675 540 135 133 2 238 2 99% 99% 99% 99%
AL-USA 570 456 114 113 1 239 1 99% 99% 99% 99%
SF-ALL 761 609 152 151 1 238 2 99% 99% 99% 99%
SF-USA 570 456 114 113 1 225 15 99% 87% 95% 92%
MS-USA 224 179 45 45 0 240 0 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 8: Effectiveness of lexical features (+SVM) in detecting like farm users.
Campaign Total Training Testing TP FP TN FN Precision Recall Accuracy F1-
Users Set Set Score
BL-USA 583 466 117 116 1 278 4 99% 97% 99% 98%
AL-ALL 707 566 141 140 1 278 4 99% 97% 99% 98%
AL-USA 827 662 164 164 0 275 7 100% 96% 98% 97%
SF-ALL 870 696 174 172 2 271 11 99% 94% 97% 96%
SF-USA 653 522 131 130 1 273 9 99% 93% 98% 96%
MS-USA 259 207 52 52 0 280 2 100% 96% 99% 98%
Table 9: Effectiveness of both lexical and non-lexical features (+SVM) in detecting like farm users.
Campaign SVM Decision Tree AdaBoost kNN Random Forest Naı¨ve Bayes
BL-USA 98% 96% 96% 91% 88% 53%
AL-ALL 98% 84% 95% 86% 84% 75%
AL-USA 97% 88% 90% 91% 86% 81%
SF-ALL 96% 90% 94% 89% 87% 67%
SF-USA 96% 83% 92% 79% 78% 61%
MS-USA 98% 90% 89% 89% 87% 74%
Table 10: F1-Score obtained with different classification methods, using both lexical and non-lexical features, in detecting like farm users.
the SVM classifier achieves the highest F1-Scores across the
board. Due to overfitting on our dataset, Random Forest and
Naı¨ve Bayes show poor results and require mechanism such as
pruning, detailed analysis of parameters, as well as selection
of the optimal set of prominent features to improve classifica-
tion performance [26, 6].
Analysis. We now analyze in more details the classification
performance (in terms of F1-Score) to identify the most dis-
tinctive features. Specifically, we incrementally add lexical
and non-lexical features to train and test our classifier for all
campaigns. We observe that the average word length (cf. Fig-
ure 10(a)) and average number of words per post (cf. Fig-
ure 10(b)) provide the most improvement in the F1-Score for
all campaigns. This finding suggests that like farm users use
shorter words and fewer number of words in their timeline
posts as compared to baseline users. While these features pro-
vide the largest improvement in detecting a like farm account,
an attempt to circumvent detection by increasing the word
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length or number of words per post will also effect the ARI,
Flesch score, and richness. That is, increasing word length
and number of words on posts in a way that is not readable nor
understandable, will not improve the overall outlook of the ac-
count to appear real. Therefore, combining several features
increases the workload required to appear real on like farm ac-
counts. The overall classification accuracy with both lexical
and non-lexical features is reported in Figure 10(c).
Robustness Of Our Approach. The like farms users may
evade our detection system by mimicking the behavior of real
users. To test the effectiveness of our features and classifiers,
we assume two worst case attacking scenarios: (i) fractions of
like farms users mimic all features of baseline users; and (ii)
all like farm users mimic sets of baseline users’ features We
simulate the first scenario by assuming that sets of like farm
users randomly select baseline users and aggressively replace
the values of all their features with that of the selected baseline
users. We use the aforementioned settings of the best of our
classifiers, SVM, and run the experiments for each like farm
10 times. Figure 11 shows the effect on F1-Score of our clas-
sifier when fractions of like farm users aggressively mimic all
the lexical and non-lexical features of baseline users. When
30% of like farms users coordinate and mimic all features of
baseline users, we observe that our classifier achieves at least
73% F1-Score and at most 17% false positive ratio, decreasing
26% F1-Score compared to our approach (cf. Table 9). For the
latter case, we assume that all like farms users coordinate and
select sets of features from randomly selected baseline users
that they copy or mimic. We use identical configuration of our
SVM classifier, and conduct experiments for each like farm
10 times. Table 11 summarizes the results of our experiments.
With this attack strategy, we observe that when only one fea-
ture is mimicked, the F1-Score of our approach (cf. Table 9)
decreases by between 1% to 8%. The F1-Score of our clas-
sifier decreases by between 26% to 56% when the like farm
users target sets of 8 features including prominent ones (cf.
Figure 10). Note that any feature used to identify fake like
farms behavior can be either circumvented or manipulated by
the like farms users by behaving more like real users. We be-
lieve that this is a typical arm-race that eventually raise the
bar for the like farms – the more effort they need to invest in
appearing as real users, the lower their incentive is to do this.
Remarks. Our results demonstrate that it is possible to ac-
curately detect like farm users from both sophisticated and
naı¨ve farms by incorporating additional account information
– specifically, timeline activities. The low false positive ratio
(1%, cf. Table 9) highlights the effectiveness of our ap-
proach as well as the limitations of prior graph co-clustering
algorithms in detecting like farms users (cf. Section 3). Unfor-
tunately, we do not have access to a larger dataset to measure
and discuss the effects on false positive ratio of our approach.
We believe then that without an evaluation of our approach at a
larger scale, further discussion would be speculative so we re-
frained from further interpretation of those results. We also ar-
gue that the use of a variety of lexical and non-lexical features
will make it difficult for like farm operators to circumvent de-
tection. Like farms typically rely on pre-defined lists of com-
ments, resulting in word repetition and lower lexical richness.
As a result, we argue that, should our proposed techniques
be deployed by Facebook, it will be challenging, as well as
costly, for fraudsters to modify their behavior and evade de-
tection, since this would require instructing automated scripts
and/or cheap human labor to match the diversity and richness
of real users’ timeline posts.
6 Related Work
Prior work has focused quite extensively on the analysis
and the detection of sybil and/or fake accounts in online so-
cial networks by relying on tightly-knit community struc-
tures [54, 15, 53, 9, 52, 5]. By contrast, we work to detect
accounts that are employed by like farms to boost the num-
ber of Facebook page likes, whether they are operated by a
bot or a human. We highlight several characteristics about the
social structure and activity of fake profiles attracted by the
honeypot pages, e.g., their interconnected nature or the activ-
ity bursts. In fact, our analysis does not only confirm a few in-
sights used by sybil detection algorithms but also reveals new
patterns that could complement them. Fraud and fake activi-
ties are not restricted to social network, but widespread also on
other platforms, such as online gaming. In this context, [29]
rely on self-similarity to effectively measure the frequency of
repeated activities per player over time, and use it to identify
bots. Also, [27] analyze the characteristics of the ecosystem
of multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs), and
devise a method for detecting gold farming groups (GFGs),
based on graph techniques.
Prior work on reputation manipulation on social networks
include a few passive measurement studies have also focused
on characterizing fake user accounts and their activity. Nazir
et al. [34] studied phantom profiles in Facebook gaming ap-
plications, while Thomas et al. [47] analyzed over 1.1 mil-
lion accounts suspended by Twitter. Gao et al. [21] studied
spam campaigns on Facebook originating from approximately
57,000 user accounts. Yang et al. [52] performed an empiri-
cal analysis of social relationships between spam accounts on
Twitter, and Dave et al. [16] proposed a methodology to mea-
sure and fingerprint click-spam in ad networks. Our work dif-
fers from these studies as they all conducted passive measure-
ments, whereas we rely on the deployment of several honeypot
pages and (paid) campaigns to actively engage with fake pro-
files. Lee et al. [30] and Stringhini et al. [44] created honeypot
profiles in Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter to detect spam-
mers while we use accounts attracted by our honeypot Face-
book pages that actively engage like farms. Unlike [30, 44],
we leverage timeline-based features for the detection of fake
accounts. Our work also differs from theirs in that (1) their
honeypot profiles were designed to look legitimate, while our
honeypot pages explicitly indicated they were not “real” (to
deflect real profiles), and (2) our honeypot pages actively at-
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Figure 10: Cumulative F1-Score for all lexical and non-lexical features measured. The X-axis shows the incremental inclusion of features in
both training and testing of SVM. Details of the classification performance for all features are listed in Table 9.
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Figure 11: Average F1-Score and false positive ratio measured when fractions of like farms users mimic all lexical and non-lexical features
(+SVM). The X-axis shows the percentage of like farms users that are mimicking baseline users.
tracted fake profiles by means of paid campaigns, as opposed
to passive honeypot profiles.
Thomas et al. [48] analyzed trafficking of fake accounts in
Twitter. They bought fake profiles from 27 merchants and de-
veloped a classifier to detect these fake accounts. In a sim-
ilar study, Stringhini et al. [43, 46] analyzed the market of
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∆ F1-Score
Campaign 1-Feature 2-Features 3-Features 4-Features 8-Features
BL-USA 1% 2% 3% 5% 42%
AL-ALL 2% 3% 4% 5% 47%
AL-USA 2% 4% 5% 10% 20%
SF-ALL 3% 4% 6% 6% 56%
SF-USA 8% 9% 11% 13% 55%
MS-USA 5% 6% 6% 7% 26%
Table 11: The difference in F1-Score obtained when all like farm users coordinate and mimic sets of lexical and non-lexical features of baseline
users. F1-Score in Table 9 is used as a reference to compute the ∆ in F1-Score.
Twitter followers, which, akin to Facebook like farms, pro-
vide Twitter followers for sale. Note that Twitter follower
markets differ from Facebook like farms as Twitter entails a
follower-followee relationship among users, while Facebook
friendships imply a bidirectional relationships. Also, there is
no equivalent of liking a Facebook page in the Twitter ecosys-
tem.
Wang et al. [51] studied human involvement in Weibo’s rep-
utation manipulation services, showing that simple evasion at-
tacks (e.g., workers modifying their behavior) as well as poi-
soning attacks (e.g., administrators tampering with the training
set) can severely affect the effectiveness of machine learning
algorithms to detect malicious crowd-sourcing workers. Song
et al. [42] also looked at crowdturfing services that manipu-
late account popularity on Twitter through artificial retweet
and developed “CrowdTarget” to detect such tweets. Partially
informed by these studies, we do not only cluster like activity
performed by users but also build on lexical and non-lexical
features.
Specific to Facebook fraud is CopyCatch [4], a technique
deployed by Facebook to detect fraudulent accounts by identi-
fying groups of connected users liking a set of pages within
a short time frame. SynchroTrap [10] extended CopyCatch
by clustering accounts that perform similar, possibly mali-
cious, synchronized actions, using tunable parameters such as
time-window and similarity thresholds in order to improve de-
tection accuracy. However, as discussed earlier, while some
farms seem to be operated by bots (producing large bursts of
likes and having limited numbers of friends) that do not re-
ally try to hide their activities, other stealthier farms exhibit
behavior that may be challenging to detect with tools like
CopyCatch and SynchroTrap. In fact, our evaluation of graph
co-clustering techniques shows that these farms successfully
evade detection by avoiding lockstep behavior and liking sets
of seemingly random pages. As a result, we use timeline fea-
tures, relying on both lexical and non-lexical features to build
a classifier that detects stealthy like farm users with high ac-
curacy. Finally, we highlight that our work can complement
other methods used in prior work to detect fake and compro-
mised accounts, such as using unsupervised anomaly detection
techniques [50], temporal features [23, 24], IP addresses [45],
as well as generic supervised learning [3].
Remarks on “New Material”. Compared to our preliminary
results (published in [17] and reported in Section 2), this ar-
ticle clearly introduces significant additional new material.
Specifically: (i) we introduce an empirical evaluation demon-
strating that temporal and social graph analysis can only be
used to detect naive farms (Section 3), and (ii) we present a
novel timeline-based classifier geared to detect accounts from
stealthy like farms with a remarkably high degree of accuracy
(Sections 4 and 5).
7 Conclusion
Minimizing fraud in online social networks is crucial for
maintaining the confidence and trust of the user base and in-
vestors. In this paper, we presented the results of a measure-
ment study of Facebook like farms – i.e., paid services arti-
ficially boosting the number of likes on a Facebook page –
aiming to identify characteristics and accurately detect the ac-
counts used by them. We crawled profile information, liking
patterns, and timeline activities from like farms accounts. Our
demographic, temporal, and social graph analysis highlighted
similar patterns between accounts across different like farms
and revealed two main modi operandi: some farms seem to be
operated by bots and do not really try to hide the nature of their
operations, while others follow a stealthier approach, mimick-
ing regular users’ behavior. We then evaluated the effective-
ness of existing graph based fraud detection algorithms, such
as CopyCatch [4] and SynchroTrap [10], and demonstrated
that sophisticated like farms can successfully evade detection.
Next, aiming to address their shortcomings, we focused on
incorporating additional profile information from accounts’
timelines in order to train machine learning classifiers geared
to distinguish between like farm users from normal ones.
We extracted lexical and non-lexical features from user time-
lines, finding that posts by like farm accounts have 43%
fewer words, a more limited vocabulary, and lower readabil-
ity than normal users’ posts. Moreover, like farm posts gener-
ated significantly more comments and likes, and a large frac-
tion of their posts consists of non original and often redundant
“shared activity” (i.e., repeatedly sharing posts made by other
users, articles, videos, and external URLs). By leveraging both
lexical and non-lexical features, we experimented with several
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machine learning classifiers, with the best of our classifiers
(SVM) achieving as high as 100% precision and 97% of recall,
and at least 99% and 93% respectively across all campaigns –
significantly higher than graph co-clustering techniques.
In theory, fraudsters could try to modify their behavior in
order to evade our proposed timeline-based detection. How-
ever, like farms either heavily automate mechanisms or rely on
manual input of cheap human labor. Since non-lexical features
are extracted from users’ interactions with timeline posts, imi-
tating normal users’ behaviors will likely incur an remarkably
higher cost. Even higher would be the cost to interfere with
lexical features, since this would entail modifying or imitating
normal users’ writing style.
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